An Abiding Definition for Theonomy: "Solus Bahnsenus" just won't do. . . .

 

 

 

 

 

Christian Reconstruction and Theonomy have always suffered, as a movement, from disunity. This fractious disunity occurs due to both doctrinal and in-house political fissures. My overviews and work, including what is below regarding Greg Bahnsen, have sought to supply a gaping lack in the first and also to help draw some lines of clarification for the second. I think we need to revisit these.

Our disunity has occurred for the same reasons disunity has always plagued the church throughout history, but it is magnified in our circle because the circle was small to begin with, and because it was at heart always a puritan movement. Puritan movements always face the risk of purifying the church until you’re the only one left in it. We have done this well.

I suspect that in a short time, someone will unwittingly prove me right by presenting some fatal criticism to my view, rendering me at once helplessly defeated and excommunicated from one circle or other. If you wait long enough, that guy may just be me. Indeed, there are some who argue it already was!

In what follows, you will see some provocative comments of mine regarding the work of Greg Bahnsen and Theonomy. I think his work was both foundational and fatally deficient in one crucial area. I share this bit to highlight the need for why I wrote Bounds of Love and the followed up with the deeper biblical theology in A Consuming Fire. After several chapters of nothing but biblical (and some historical) studies on the cherem principle, I had to write these somewhat uncomfortable reviews of Bahnsen’s work, as well as responses to certain critics. I still think we need to take this deficiency more seriously, so I highlight it again here. But I also think more work yet needs to be done to clarify more matters about God’s Law in the New Testament era and the modern world.

In the following days, I hope to offer some fresh insights about the definition and application of Theonomy. Even my own definitions, you will see, still need tweaking. Before I do that, however, I want to revisit this central issue. This is because some of what will need to be reiterated going forward will relate to the type of factiousness among us that is based more on tribal, tradition, or personality loyalties than on pure biblical exegesis. The time will come where these things need to go, and the choice will mean fading away or keeping instep with what the Spirit is doing going forward.

The following is from The Consuming Fire.

 

A very thoughtful critique1 has been offered [to my The Bounds of Love] by a Reformed Baptist and libertarian writer and businessman, Brandon Adams. Mr. Adams follows the Second London Baptist Confession, and when it comes to covenant theology and continuity of the law issues, he is an adherent of the views of the famous author of the precursor to that document, the Savoy Declaration, the Puritan theologian John Owen. We have refer­enced Owen’s views in the chapter on precedents previously, and since these views are important and since Mr. Adam’s represents them well, this is a good opportunity.

The meaning and definitions of Theonomy

Adams is well versed in Reformed theological views, includ­ing those of Theonomy as presented by Greg Bahnsen and others. His first comments regarding The Bounds of Love concern how my developed views compare to something like an accepted definition of “Theonomy.”

For example, in my book, I said that I was in part answering some questions I felt previous writers had left undefined. Adams seems to suggest, however, that I have left Theonomy behind and was perhaps playing a bit loose with the facts on this. He says that theonomic writers did answer the questions in the past; I just didn’t like their answers. He argues, then, that I did not really write an introduction to Theonomy, but a “very substantial revi­sion of it.”2

I know this is the perception of some, so it is worth a brief comment, but I do not know how he arrived at there being answers to the questions I felt were either unaddressed or inadequately addressed. For example, I can find precious little exegetical com­mentary from the most prominent theonomists on the [death penalty for] apostasy law of Deuteronomy 17. Rushdoony covers it, but almost seem­ingly in passing. In his commentary on Deuteronomy, he dedicates a grand total of three and a half pages to Deuteronomy 17:1–7, and half of the first page is taken up just printing the passage. When he arrives at the meaning of the verse, he says the subject is about treason. He does eventually admit the word “apostasy,” but seems to suggest that by this he only means radical revolutionaries. Before he moves on to the aspect of witnesses and due pro­cess, he spends a total of about a page and a half on treason and apostasy. He gives even less treatment in the first volume of his Institutes of Biblical Law (p. 66), and seems to arrive at a primitive conclusion: this is treason to God and deserves the death penalty. These treatments are hardly adequate, let alone definitive. I say they are barely even helpful.

They are more helpful at least than Bahnsen, however, who never provided any exegesis of the passage (we have already seen his passing comments in a previous chapter, where he concluded he was undecided on the passage). As we have labored to show above, Bahnsen’s big problem was that he never clarified what dis­continuities there are exactly, not that he denied there was discon­tinuity. Granted, while I find several points of critique in his work, where he actually drew the lines of discontinuity is not one of them because he never drew it, even though he spoke of it. He never nailed this line down exegetically, and his broad-brush strokes about continuity or discontinuity (depending on the paragraph) leave us with only an unresolved tension in his body of work.

North, also, provided no commentary at all, though it was because he did not see economic policy there.

So, which major writer in these schools provides the definitive exegesis and definitions? My point stands. . . .

The Abiding Definition of Theonomy

Greg Bahnsen wrote some of the foundational work on The­onomy, and he defended it vigorously against all comers. His work was needed, and is still very helpful in very many ways. I return to it often for multiple reasons. We must, however, acknowledge a few critical points.

First, Dr. Bahnsen’s view of Theonomy was not the only one. As we have seen, Dr. Rushdoony differed on significant points of theory (acknowledgment of Kline’s contribution in covenant the­ology), and of application (sabbath), just to name a couple simple ones. Likewise, as we have seen, Dr. North differed with Bahnsen on significant points as well. We could add further people to this list, some of whom have developed yet other significant contribu­tions differing with Bahnsen.

Second, in light of this, Dr. Bahnsen’s view of Theonomy is not necessarily the definitive one, despite the fact that he made foundational contributions. His classic thesis, Theonomy in Chris­tian Ethics, may bear a definitive-sounding title, but the work can­not hold that role. Of those I know who have been influenced by that work and find it greatly helpful still in many ways, I am not sure I know of any major figure who would say it defines the move­ment or the way of thought. There are certainly readers who may feel this way, but among those who have worked to contribute to developing the exegesis, virtually all have departed from Bahnsen in important ways, sometimes citing similar deficiencies in the framework of his system.

This leads us to the third point: Dr. Bahnsen’s system of Theonomy contained significant unresolved problems and unan­swered questions. Dr. North’s essay in the previous chapter dem­onstrates a core problem: Bahnsen did not have any hermeneu­tical mechanism for discontinuities in the law, despite affirming they exist. This single problem arises in key critical interactions and leaves Dr. Bahnsen’s criticisms as debatable as the points he attacks, sometimes more so. We will see this on repeated occa­sions in these next two chapters.

When the issue of a definition of Theonomy arises, then, are we required to accept Greg Bahnsen’s definitions and qualifica­tions in exhaustive detail in order to remain within the view of “Theonomy”? I do not know of any serious contributor to the Theonomy discussion, well-known or not, who would not force­fully reject that standard. As I have already written in The Bounds of Love, I certainly would not ever have accepted such a standard, which of course puts me with the vast majority in the camp. There are several positions represented regarding the continuity of cer­tain penal sanctions, among other things, and yet the majority I know still consider everyone else a theonomist. I suspect that I personally have the broadest penumbra of tolerance here, now notoriously allowing even A. W. Pink to be theonomic due merely to his stated position on the lex talionis.3 In my view, the bottom line should be whether one sees some substantial continuity of Old Testament judicial law into the New Covenant era. I may have specific disagreements with them, but still see them as partners in the overall theonomic discussion. Others may disagree with my standard. Others have differing standards: Rushdoony and North both see at least the death penalty for sabbath-breaking as no longer binding. It is not clear whether Bahnsen did, but in at least one class lecture, he said he could see no reason that penalty should not still apply today. James Jordan arrived at something much closer to what my position is now. I still consider him theo­nomic (despite severe disagreements in other areas), although I think he was hurt enough by some of Bahnsen’s criticisms of him that he dropped the label.

No two of these great writers and thinkers ever arrived at the exact same set of abiding laws, or even the exact same her­meneutic, let alone detailed applications, yet we all realize that “Theonomy” is a more general label for a broader discipline of theological study. Certainly no one I know would require lock-step with Bahnsen or anyone else in order to use that label. The only people I know who would make an issue otherwise seem to be those who are avowed opponents of mine (for whatever reason) who seem to have one or other vested personal interest in strip­ping me of that label. It was, however, Greg Bahnsen himself who stated that we must not allow Theonomy to be defined by every peculiar detailed application made by any given writer who calls themselves theonomic. As he put it:

The attempt to interpret and apply the details of God’s commandments is a very necessary task, but one which leaves much room for controversy and disagreement. I myself do not agree at a number of points with the exegesis or reasoning attempted by many who have been identified as theonomists.

Likewise,

  1. Theonomists may readily disagree with each other on particular issues in normative ethics, and yet all be genuine adherents of the theonomic per­spective and agree on essential points about how we should reach ethical conclusions.

  2. Not everything taught by someone who calls himself a “theonomist” thereby becomes an essen­tial part of the theonomic school of thought or even (as such) compatible with its essential principles.

Therefore, not everything said or published by theonomists is thereby fair game for criticizing “the theonomic perspective.” We all acknowledge this kind of thing in dealing with other schools of thought.4

Bahnsen would have done well to take his own advice, then, when looking at fellow theonomists as if his views alone defined Theonomy. In an unfortunate footnote only a mere few pages after these very comments, he referred to “the departure of Sut­ton and Jordan from theonomic exegesis or reasoning.”5 In 1991 when Bahnsen published this statement, Jordan still adhered to the continuing relevance of Mosaic Law for today, including some civil issues. He simply did not conform to “every jot and tittle” of Bahnsen‘s view. Likewise, Sutton continued affirming the central role of biblical law in his covenant system in That You May Prosper, which was published a year after Bahnsen made this unfortunate, divisive statement. That book went into its third printing with the same view in 1997, even after Bahnsen had left the earthly scene. He applied his own advice well when it was the details of other people inconveniencing him; but when he insisted upon even his own extreme details, he seemed to forget it and toss the others under the bus. Theonomy grew out of Reformational thought and is based upon the great Reformation doctrine of sola scriptura. In light of this, any appeals to Solus Bahnsenus are doomed to failure and to laughter.

The greatest problem here is that, even though Bahnsen seemed to hold others to the rigorous standard of his fine details, he never fleshed out crucial aspects of those details so anyone could even know them. As already stated, his dilemma resulted from insisting on abiding validity in exhaustive detail. That works fine when you are refuting Dispensationalists. But when you have to answer the question of discontinuity yourself, you need a her­meneutic and some specific applications that make your system viable and clear. Bahnsen never provided this. We are stuck with the Bahnsen rule and only lip service given to discontinuities in the law—no actual exegetical system of discontinuity.

(From A Consuming Fire: The Holy of Holies in Biblical Law, 279–281, 197–201.)

 

I want to be clear here that I am merely stating and illustrating the existence of a problem in the movement that needed addressing. As far as I know, Dr. North and I are the only ones who have written extensively trying to address this problem in particular. James Jordan did some work to some degree in his own way, some of which I find quite helpful and persuasive. North’s conclusions appear in his larger commentaries on Leviticus. Mine build on these and expand much further. A Consuming Fire is the most advanced attempt I know of in our circles to provide and defend and exegetical and biblical-theological hermeneutical that addresses the continuity and discontinuity of the law in much detail.

 

Notes

  1. This review of The Bounds of Love is at https://www.goodreads.com/review/show/1674021304. ↩
  2. Quotations from the review are from an unpaginated single PDF version. Interested readers can see the version posted online in the link above. ↩
  3. See The Bounds of Love, 137–138. ↩
  4. Greg L. Bahnsen, No Other Standard: Theonomy and Its Critics (Tyler, TX: Institute for Christian Economics, 1991), 20–21, 20–21n5. ↩
  5. No Other Standard, 24n11. ↩
 
Joel McDurmon